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ABSTRACT 
By interpreting Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to 
apply in all conflicts not qualifying as international, the Supreme 
Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld closed the transnational warfare 
regulatory gap for the United States.  This understanding and 
application of Common Article 3 ensured Salim Ahmed Hamdan 
and other al-Qaeda detainees held by the country received basic 
humanitarian protections.  However, as later interpreted by the 
executive branch, the decision also laid the foundation for the 
government’s legal justifications for wide-ranging and oft-criticized 
military activities abroad, including drone strikes far from the “hot 
battlefield.”  Ultimately, the Hamdan decision provided an 
unexpected legal basis for the United States to lethally target non-
State adversaries spread across the globe.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Reporting on the outcome of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,1 the New York 
Times noted that the decision “was such a sweeping and categorical 
defeat for the [Bush] administration that it left human rights 
lawyers . . .  almost speechless with surprise and delight...”2  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court opinion appeared to present a heavy-handed 
check against the President by declaring the Guantanamo military 
commissions, as they stood at the time, to be unlawful.  But the full 
import of the case—and Hamdan’s Janus face—would emerge only 
in the following years.  The Court’s decision to classify the war 
against al-Qaeda under the Geneva Conventions resulted in an 
unexpected and perhaps counterintuitive boon to the government’s 
legal authority to conduct warfare.  In fact, the opinion has become 
a central precedent for the executive branch in legally justifying its 
long-running and geographically-dispersed operations in the global 
war against non-State armed groups.  This Article will trace the role 
of Hamdan in how the United States government currently justifies 
its overseas conduct of hostilities—both under international and 
domestic law. 
Part I of this Article will explore the importance of conflict 
classification under the law of armed conflict and Hamdan’s essential 
holding regarding the conflict with al-Qaeda.  Part II begins with an 
examination of how the executive branch has used Hamdan in both 
public statements and disclosed legal opinions.  It then examines the 
far-reaching ways the United States has relied upon the opinion to 
strengthen its legal case for status-based targeting of individuals 
beyond the traditional “hot battlefield.”  Next, the Article will 
explain how the decision has been influential in justifying the 
nation’s conduct of hostilities, compliance with the United Nations 
Charter, and conformity with domestic Congressional authority.  
Finally, in Part III, this Article offers some thoughts on the broader 
impacts and potential long-term effects of Hamdan’s legacy. 
 
 1 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 2 Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 30, 2006),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/30/washington/30hamdan.html 
[https://perma.cc/NPQ7-X4NE]. 
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1. HAMDAN AND CONFLICT CLASSIFICATION 
1.1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
Almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the United States 
began capturing suspected al-Qaeda actors operating abroad.3  With 
physical custody, however, came the question of the legal status and 
rights of the detainees.4  The Bush Administration determined that 
the conflict with al-Qaeda did not fall under the legal auspices of the 
Geneva Conventions, and therefore the humanitarian precepts 
within those treaties did not apply to detainees. 5   With the 
understanding that the country was operating in a legal lacuna that 
fell beyond the international regulatory scheme, the President 
ordered detainees be tried by military commission—the procedures 
of which were established by the executive branch.6 
Salim Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was captured by militia 
forces and turned over to the United States in the early weeks of the 
conflict in Afghanistan.7  While detained at Guantanamo Bay, he 
was notified that he would face a military commission for a variety 
of charges stemming from his activities as bodyguard and chauffeur 
for Osama bin Laden.8  Hamdan filed a petition in federal court 
 
 3  See, e.g., Newsweek Staff, Sept. 11 Terrorists: List of Captured and Killed, 
NEWSWEEK (Sep. 4, 2011), http://www.newsweek.com/sept-11-terrorists-list-
captured-and-killed-67357 [https://perma.cc/U3PC-9TA7] (noting that many of 
al-Qaeda’s senior leadership were captured by January 2002). 
 4  The debates preceding the Hamdan decision are well-documented and 
outside the scope of this paper.  For an excellent discussion on the various legal 
debates immediately following 9/11, see generally Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 
Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of 
Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military 
Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335 (2004). 
 5 See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legal Counsel to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. 
Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties 
and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees at 8 (Jan. 22, 2002) (stating that Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not apply to “an armed conflict between 
a nation-State and a transnational terrorist organization,” as the non-State group 
could not be a party to the treaties). 
 6  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568-69 (2006); see also Detention, 
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (providing an overview of the U.S.’s understanding of 
the applicable legal framework in the War on Terror). 
 7 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006). 
 8 Id. at 570. 
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making multiple challenges to the proposed military commissions—
most notably that their procedures violated both domestic law and 
international law under the Geneva Conventions.9 
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court agreed with 
Hamdan on both counts.  The Court held that the government 
violated domestic law because the procedures and rules of evidence 
for the commissions deviated substantially from those of military 
courts martial—contrary to the requirements of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice.10   Going further, the Court rejected the Bush 
Administration’s contention that the Geneva Conventions did not 
apply in the case, and held that the humanitarian protections 
contained Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions—
applicable to non-international armed conflicts—did indeed apply.11  
Therefore, Hamdan was entitled to a “regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples.” 12   The Court held that the 
commissions failed to comply with this requirement, as they did not 
guarantee that detainees could be present during all parts of the 
proceedings, nor did they grant detainees the right to examine all 
evidence against them.13 
By all accounts, the Hamdan holding appeared to be a victory for 
detainee rights and a rebuke against the Bush Administration’s legal 
constructs surrounding the war on terror.  However, in fact, the 
Court’s conclusion regarding conflict classification opened the door 
for the executive branch’s global application of the substantive law 
of armed conflict. 
 
 9 Id. at 624, 631–32. 
 10 Id. at 620–624 (citing Article 36 of the UCMJ).  Article 36 states: (a) The 
procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial, courts of 
inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals may be prescribed by 
the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply 
the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of 
criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to 
or inconsistent with this chapter; (b) All rules and regulations made under this 
article shall be uniform insofar as practicable and shall be reported to Congress. 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 949(a) (2016). 
 11 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 625–35 (2006). 
 12 Id. at 633. 
 13 Id. at 634. 
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1.2. Conflict Classification 
1.2.1. When is the Law of Armed Conflict Applicable? 
Seventeenth-century jurist Hugo Grotius wrote that in warfare, 
belligerents must “not believe that either nothing is allowable, or 
that everything is.”14  That violence in warfare is restricted to only 
that which is necessary is the foundational precept for the law of 
armed conflict.15  This body of law attempts to “protect persons who 
are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts 
the means and methods of warfare”16 by striking a balance between 
military necessity and humanity.17  This equilibrium permeates the 
entire law of armed conflict thereby ensuring that force is applied in 
warfare in a manner allowing for mission accomplishment while 
simultaneously taking appropriate humanitarian considerations 
into account.18  Only in an armed conflict does this specialized area 
of international law apply19  with all other violence regulated by 
 
 14 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 9 (Stephen C. Neff ed., 
2012). 
 15  See Brian J. Bill, The Rendulic ‘Rule’: Military Necessity, Commander’s 
Knowledge, and Methods of Warfare, 12 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 119 (2009) 
(examining the principle of military necessity).  
 16 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Advisory Serv. on Int’l Humanitarian Law, 
What is International Humanitarian Law? (2004), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H2VN-QVDS] [hereinafter ICRC, What is International 
Humanitarian Law?]. 
 17 The principle of military necessity states that a belligerent party may only 
apply the degree and kind of regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by the laws 
of war, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least 
possible expenditure of time, life, and physical resources.  Similarly, the principle 
of humanity prohibits the employment of any kind or degree of force not necessary 
for the purpose of war.  GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN 
OPERATIONAL APPROACH 112 (2012). 
 18 See Shane R. Reeves & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Are We Reaching a Tipping Point? 
How Contemporary Challenges are Affecting the Military Necessity-Humanity Balance, 
HARV. NAT. SEC. J. 1 (2013) (“This equilibrium permeates the entirety of that field of 
law, thereby ensuring that force is applied on the battlefield in a manner allowing 
for the accomplishment of the mission while simultaneously taking appropriate 
humanitarian considerations into account.”).  
 19  See ICRC, What is International Humanitarian Law?, supra note 16 
(“International humanitarian law applies only to [international or non-
international] armed conflict; it does not cover internal tensions or disturbances 
such as isolated acts of violence. The law applies only once a conflict has begun, 
and then equally to all sides regardless of who started the fighting.”). 
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domestic legal authorities and, to some extent, human rights law.20  
Rules for the use of force and protection of civilian rights under 
international human rights norms differ in important ways from 
those within the law of armed conflict.21 
While there is not a conclusive definition of the term “armed 
conflict,”22 it is broadly understood to “exist whenever there is a 
resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State.”23  When an armed conflict 
does exist, the law applies in its entirety,24 or in part, depending on 
whether the hostilities are classified as international or non-
international.  Characterizing an armed conflict is therefore the next 
critical step to determine the applicable regulatory framework. 
 
 20 Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the 
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 13, 50–56 
(Michael Schmitt et al. eds., 2010).  The right to life, for example, is guaranteed by 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  Id. at 50.  The U.S. 
position is that the ICCPR does not have extraterritorial application, however.  Id.  
The U.S. has maintained that customary international human rights law does apply, 
regardless of location.  Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Law and U.S. Military 
Operations in Foreign Countries: The Prohibition on Arbitrary Deprivation of Life, JUST 
SECURITY (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/62630/international-
human-rights-law-u-s-military-operations-foreign-countries-prohibition-arbitrary-
deprivation-life/ [https://perma.cc/5UF8-D9GJ]. 
 21  See Chesney, supra note 20; Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interaction 
between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or 
Convergence?, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161 (2008) (providing an examination of the 
relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law—and 
the debates surrounding that relationship. Substantive differences between human 
rights law and the law of armed conflict will be discussed in section 2.2.5).  
 22 ”In U.S. practice (and international practice in general), the meaning of this 
term is based in large measure on the guidance offered by the Commentaries to the 
four Geneva Conventions” which propose “a number of factors to be assessed, in a 
totality-of-circumstances approach” to determine what “situations qualify as 
armed conflicts.”  Geoffrey S. Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, in U.S. 
MILITARY OPERATIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 72 (Corn et al. eds., 2015) 
[hereinafter Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations]. 
 23 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 24  However, the law of occupation—which is part of the law of armed 
conflict—only applies when a party exercises authority over another State’s 
territory.  Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Law and Customs of War on 
Land art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227 and Annex, 36 Stat. 2295 [hereinafter Hague 
Regulation IV]. 
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1.2.2. International Armed Conflict, Non-International Armed 
Conflict, or Neither? 
The law of armed conflict does not recognize a unitary concept 
of warfare and relies instead on a dual categorization.25  Common 
Articles 2 and 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions establish the 
framework for these categories of armed conflict.26  These articles, 
often called “Common Articles” as they are repeated verbatim in all 
four the Conventions, 27  dictate which parts of the Geneva 
Conventions are applicable.28  Common Article 2 states that in “all 
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them” the Conventions 
apply. 29   This situation is generally understood to constitute an 
international armed conflict. 30   With “armed conflict” as the 
initiating mechanism in Common Article 2, de facto hostilities 
between State actors, versus only situations of de jure war, are 
regulated.31  Further, the intensity and duration of the fighting is 
generally considered to be irrelevant32 as “[a]ny difference arising 
between two States and leading to the intervention of members of 
 
 25 See Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32 (Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst ed., 2012) (“[I]nternational humanitarian law does not recognize a 
unitary concept of armed conflict but, rather, recognizes two types of armed 
conflicts: international and non-international.”).  
 26 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II].  The law of armed conflict is also applicable 
in situations of occupation or partial occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party.  Id. art. 2. 
 27  See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 84–85 (2010) (explaining that there are roughly twelve 
such articles found in the Geneva Conventions).   
 28 Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22, at 70. 
 29 GC II, supra note 26, art. 2. 
 30 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in 
International Humanitarian Law?, Opinion Paper 1 (Mar. 2008), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-
conflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DAE-4TK4] [hereinafter ICRC Armed Conflict]. 
 31  See 3 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 
AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 23 (Jean S. Pictet et al. eds., 1960) [hereinafter 
COMMENTARY, GC III] (noting that “[t]he occurrence of de facto hostilities is 
sufficient” to satisfy the conditions established in Common Article 2). 
 32 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 69–70 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
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the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 
2.”33  Common Article 2 is therefore relatively easy to trigger, as 
even detaining a member of the enemy force may be enough to 
initiate an international armed conflict.34 
In comparison, determining the existence of a non-international 
armed conflict is more complicated, as the line of demarcation 
between internal State violence and hostilities rising to a sufficient 
threshold level—thereby triggering international law—is often 
unclear.35  At times called civil wars, rebellions, revolutions, guerilla 
warfare, resistance movements, internal uprisings, or wars of self-
determination,36 these conflicts are simply described in Common 
Article 3 as “not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”37  The drafters of 
the Geneva Conventions, hoping to regulate as many of these 
internal struggles as possible,38 avoided concretely describing a non-
international armed conflict.  Instead, the Commentary to Article 339  
offers a number of non-binding criteria that, when looked at in 
totality, help assess the existence of a “genuine armed conflict from 
a mere act of banditry or an unorganized and short-lived 
insurrection.” 40   Despite the belief that these subjective factors 
 
 33 COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note  31, at 23.  Again, it is important to note that 
Common Article 2 is triggered “even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a 
state of war.”  Id. 
 34 Id. (“Even if there has been no fighting, the fact that persons covered by the 
Convention are detained is sufficient for its application.  The number of persons 
captured in such circumstances is, of course, immaterial.”). 
 35 Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22 , at 73–74.  
 36 EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 5 (2008). 
 37 GC II, supra note 26, art. 3. 
 38 See generally COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 31, at 36–37 (expressing the 
ICRC’s view that “no Government can object to observing, in its dealings with 
enemies, whatever the nature of the conflict between it and them, a few essential 
rules . . . under its own laws“). 
 39 Common Articles 2 and 3 also have identical commentary language in each 
of the four separate Commentaries. 
 40  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE 
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR. GENEVA, 19 AUGUST 1949, 
COMMENTARY OF 1958, ART. 3, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/COM/380-
600006?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/GDU7-2Q5R].  See also COMMENTARY, 
GC III, supra note 31, at 35–36.  The non-binding criteria include that: the non-State 
armed group is an organized military force, is under responsible command, with 
control of territory, has the means to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva 
Convention, and the State actor responds with their regular armed forces.  Id.  Of 
these criteria, a State responding to a non-State threat with their armed forces “is a 
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would result in the broad application of the humanitarian 
protections embedded in Common Article 3, the opposite has 
typically occurred.  The ambiguity creates a blurry line between 
“isolated and sporadic acts of violence” 41  and non-international 
armed conflicts.  States, looking to “avoid the perception of having 
lost control of an internal situation,”42 have often exploited this gray 
area by interpreting the non-binding criteria as indicating their 
particular internal disturbance as falling below the threshold of 
armed conflict.  As a result, it has been historically rare for nations 
experiencing such conflicts to publicly acknowledge that a non-
international armed conflict exists.43 
Without a definitive description of what constitutes a “non-
international armed conflict,” various understandings of the phrase 
exist.  Additionally, Protocol II describes these conflicts as those 
which are not covered by Additional Protocol I and:  
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party 
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as 
to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol.44  
Controlling sufficient territory from which to launch military 
operations, a criterion to the Additional Protocol II definition, is 
 
significant indicator that the situation has most likely crossed the threshold into the 
realm of armed conflict.”  Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 
22, at 74. 
 41  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II) art. 1(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611 [hereinafter AP II].  AP II 
“supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions.”  Id.  AP II has not 
been ratified by the United States.  However, the United States views much of AP 
II as customary international law and therefore obligates itself to follow those 
specific provisions when an armed conflict is triggered.  Michael J. Matheson, The 
United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in 2 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419, 
430–31 (Jan. 22, 1987). 
 42 Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22, at 73–74. 
 43  JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., INT’L & OPERATIONAL L. DEP’T, 
OPERATIONAL L. HANDBOOK 15 (William Johnson & David Lee eds., 2014), 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-
handbook_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4WC-ME2P].  This is especially the case 
for armed conflicts occurring before 9/11.  Id. 
 44 AP II, supra note 41, at 611. 
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rarely satisfied by non-State armed groups.45  Further, according to 
this definition, hostilities exclusively between non-State armed 
groups do not qualify as a non-international armed conflict.46 
The two factors noted in the Prosecutor v. Tadić47 case are more 
widely accepted as establishing the existence of a non-international 
armed conflict.48  Under the first factor, hostilities must rise to a 
minimum level of intensity and duration, which amounts to 
protracted armed violence.49  Under the second factor, the non-State 
armed groups must achieve a requisite level of organization—to 
include a chain of command and “the capacity to sustain military 
operations.”50  This two-part definition has been adopted by the 
International Criminal Court51 and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC),52 as well as many States.53 
In terms of geographic scope, non-international armed conflicts 
were historically envisioned as civil wars in which hostilities are 
fought exclusively within the internal borders of a single State.54  
While the term “internal” is not used within Common Article 3,55 
 
 45 SOLIS, supra note 27, at 131. 
 46 ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 79–80 (2008). 
 47 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 562 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). 
 48 ICRC Armed Conflict, supra note 30, at 3. 
 49 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶ 562, 
567–68 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). 
 50 ICRC Armed Conflict, supra note 30, at 3. 
 51 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 98 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  Even qualification under non-
controversial criteria, such as the need for an organized non-State armed group, is 
open to debate.  See, e.g., Akande, supra note 25, at 51 (giving a number of factors 
that indicate that a group is organized). 
 52 ICRC Armed Conflict, supra note 30, at 5. 
 53 MINISTRY OF DEF., JOINT SERV. MANUAL OF THE L. OF ARMED CONFLICT 386–87 
(2004), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/27874/JSP3832004Edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HD3-
7CSM]. 
 54  See, e.g., Rogier Bartels, Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts: The Historical 
Evolution of the Legal Divide between International and Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 35, 39 (Mar. 2009); Yoram Dinstein, 
Concluding Remarks on Non-International Armed Conflicts, in 89 INT’L L. STUD. 399, 400 
(2013) [hereinafter Dinstein, Concluding Remarks] (“The first vital ingredient of 
NIAC relates to its internal nature, i.e., that it is waged within a State.”). 
 55 See GC II, supra note 26, art. 3 (“In the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
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the Commentary states that, “[s]peaking generally, it must be 
recognized that the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed 
conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities—
conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an 
international war, but take place within the confines of a single 
country.”56  Both the Rome Statute and Additional Protocol II seem 
to contemplate the internal nature of these hostilities by defining 
these conflicts as taking place within the territory of a single nation.57 
1.2.3.  What Substantive Parts of the Law of Armed Conflict 
Apply in Each Type of Conflict? 
Armed conflicts are governed by a combination of treaty law 
and customary law.58  According to the language of Common Article 
2, the terms of the four Geneva Conventions apply in declared wars 
or any armed conflicts between High Contracting Parties as well as 
in cases of partial or total occupation.59  Additionally, all customary 
law that comprises the law of armed conflict is applicable in 
international armed conflicts.60 
A more limited body of positive law regulates non-international 
armed conflicts. 61   Common Article 3, called a “convention in 
miniature” by the Commentary, is the Geneva Conventions’ 
exclusive regulatory provision applicable in non-international 
 
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
following provisions….“). 
 56 4 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 
1949: COMMENTARY 36 (Jean S. Pictet et al. eds., 1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY, GC 
IV]. 
 57 See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 8(2)(f) (“It applies to armed conflicts 
that take place in the territory of a State.”); see also AP II, supra note 41, art. 1 
(discussing how the Protocol applies “in the territory of a High Contracting Party”). 
 58 Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22, at 70. 
 59 GC II, supra note 26, art. 2. 
 60 See U.S. ARMY, JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., INT’L & OPERATIONAL 
L. DEP’T, L. OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 24–25 (5th ed., 2015) (noting that the 
entire law of armed conflict applies in an international armed conflict). 
 61 See GC II, supra note 26, art. 3 (stating that “in the case of armed conflict not 
of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a 
minimum” the limited provisions found within the article); see also ICRC, What is 
International Humanitarian Law?, supra note 16 (“A more limited range of rules apply 
to internal armed conflicts and are laid down in Article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions as well as in Additional Protocol II.”). 
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armed conflicts.62  While there are some treaties that regulate non-
international armed conflicts, 63  this body of law is less 
comprehensive than that applicable to international armed 
conflicts.64  In regards to customary international law,65 however, 
States generally agree that most of the same rules apply regardless 
of the characterization of the conflict.66  This expansive application 
of customary international law, combined with existing relevant 
treaties, results in a broad legal framework for regulating non-
international armed conflicts.67 
 
 62 See COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 31, at 34 (“Article 3 is like a ‘Convention 
in miniature’.  It applies to non-international armed conflicts only, and will be the 
only Article applicable” to the conflict participants.). 
 63  Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Rome 
Statute regulate non-international armed conflict in certain situations.  The United 
States is not a party to either of these treaties.  Additionally, there are a number of 
treaties applicable to both international and non-international armed conflicts.  See, 
e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 
U.N.T.S. 317; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163;  Dinstein, Concluding Remarks, supra 
note 54, at 406–07 (listing treaties applicable in both types of conflicts). 
 64 David Wallace et al., Trying to Make Sense of the Senseless: Classifying the 
Syrian War under the Law of Armed Conflict, 25 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 555, 577 (“As a 
matter of positive law, the differences between these two types of conflicts are 
significant with those characterized as international far more heavily regulated than 
those classified as non-international.”) (citation omitted). 
 65 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN REL. L. OF THE U.S. § 102(c)(2) (1987) 
(“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of 
States followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”).  More specifically, for a 
State practice “to become a rule of customary international law it must appear that 
the States follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinion juris sive 
necessitates); a practice that is generally followed but which States feel legally free 
to disregard does not contribute to customary law.” Id. at cmt. c. 
 66 See, e.g., Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22, at 75 
(describing the law regulating non-international armed conflicts as “expanding”); 
Michael N. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters in a Non-International Armed 
Conflict, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 119 (2012) (outlining many of the customary laws that 
apply in both international and non-international armed conflict). 
 67 See generally Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, ¶¶ 96–127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) 
(recognizing that non-international armed conflicts trigger a comprehensive body 
of international law). 
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1.2.4. Conflict Classification in Hamdan 
The long-running war between the United States and al-Qaeda 
that began on September 11, 2001 appeared to escape traditional 
notions of conflict classification. 68   Sometimes called a 
“transnational war,”69  these hostilities between a sovereign State 
and a globally dispersed non-State actor 70  did not “satisfy the 
requisite inter-State dispute element” of an international armed 
conflict, nor the “traditional internal interpretation” of a non-
international armed conflict.71  Instead, having both international 
and non-international characteristics, the war appeared to occupy a 
gap between these two categories.  This failure of the traditional 
classification paradigm gave rise to numerous legal controversies, 
including the issue of detainee treatment.72 
In arguing Hamdan, the Bush administration maintained that the 
conflict against al-Qaeda and its associates was neither a 
traditionally understood international conflict, nor a non-
international conflict under the Geneva Conventions.73  Specifically, 
 
 68 NAT’L COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., 9-11 COMMISSION 
REPORT, 362 (2004) [hereinafter 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT] (“In this sense, 9/11 has 
taught us that terrorism against American interests ‘over there' should be regarded 
just as we regard terrorism against America ‘over here.’ In this same sense, the 
American homeland is the planet.”). 
 69  Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A 
“Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. 
REV. 46–79 (2009). 
 70 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 68, at 362 (noting that transnational 
armed groups are not deterred like traditional hostile States or easily spotted like 
historic armed groups). 
 71  See Corn, Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22, at 77 
(discussing how transnational armed conflicts have “been the most significant 
source of contemporary conflict classification uncertainty”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF. QUADRENNIAL DEF. REV. REP. 8 (Feb. 2010) (discussing the difficulty in 
categorizing contemporary conflicts). 
 72 See Shane R. Reeves & David Lai, A Broad Overview of the Law of Armed 
Conflict in the Age of Terror, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERRORISM LAW 139, 142–44 
(noting the importance of characterizing a conflict as either international or non-
international). 
 73 Brief for Respondent at 26, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 547 (2006).  The 
government argued that: The Convention seeks to regulate the conduct of warfare 
to which it applies with respect to nation-states that have entered the Convention 
and agreed to abide by its terms, but is does not purport to apply to every armed 
conflict that might arise or to crowd out the common law of war.  Instead, as 
explained below, the Convention applies only to those conflicts identified in 
Articles 2 and 3.  If an armed conflict, therefore, does not fall within the 
Convention, the Convention simply does not regulate it.  Id. 
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the government argued that although the United States was 
engaged in an armed conflict “of an international character”74 with 
al-Qaeda, Common Article 2 nonetheless did not apply because it is 
only applicable to conflicts between States, or High Contracting 
Parties to the Geneva Conventions. 75   Further, the government 
argued that Common Article 3 also did not apply because that 
Article is applicable only “[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties.”76  As the conflict with al-Qaeda was “of an 
international character,” taking place in multiple countries, the 
definition was inapplicable. 77   Thus, it argued, the treatment of 
detainees taken from the battlefield escaped regulation under the 
Geneva Conventions.78 
The Court disagreed with the government’s interpretation, 
however, finding that the basic humanitarian protections, as 
outlined in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, were 
in fact applicable.79  The exact legal reasoning behind this finding, 
however, is unclear from the text of the opinion.80  The Court failed 
to state outright that the United States was involved in a non-
international armed conflict—as defined by the Geneva 
Conventions—with al-Qaeda.  Instead, it responded to the 
government’s argument that the war against al-Qaeda was an 
international armed conflict by stating that it: 
[n]eed not decide the merits of this argument because there 
is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that 
applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one between 
signatories.  Article 3 . . .  provides that in a “conflict not of 
an international character occurring in the territory of one of 
 
 74 Id. at 48. 
 75 Id. at 38–39. The Government noted, in contrast, that Common Article 2 may 
apply to the U.S.’s engagement with Afghanistan’s Taliban regime.  Id. at 40. 
 76 Id. at 48 (citing the Geneva Conventions; emphasis added in brief). 
 77 Id.  According to the Government’s argument, the United States could still 
choose to apply the (presumably customary) law of war, in the absence of 
applicable treaty law, but was not bound to the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions in relation to detainee treatment.  Id. at 26. 
 78 Id. at 26.   
 79 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 547, 629 (2006). 
 80 See Marko Milanovic, Lessons for human rights and humanitarian law in the war 
on terror: comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings case, 89 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 373, 375–81 (2007) (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court for its claim that there 
are “armed conflicts which are governed by the law of war but are not regulated by 
it”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
344 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:2 
the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall 
be bound to apply, as a minimum,” certain provisions 
protecting “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
including members of armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed hors de combat by . . .  
detention.”81  
Legal scholars have struggled to make sense of this holding—
specifically in how precisely the Court determined why Common 
Article 3 was applicable.82  One understanding is that as a matter of 
treaty law, Common Article 3, at a minimum, applies even in a 
conflict that may be considered international. 83   As is most 
commonly understood, however, the Court seems to be stating that 
the United States is, indeed, engaged in a non-international armed 
conflict with al-Qaeda, as defined by Common Article 3. 84   The 
Hamdan majority decided “the term ‘conflict not of an international 
character’ is used in ‘contradistinction to a conflict between 
nations.’”85  The Court therefore took the view that Common Article 
3 applied to any armed conflict not otherwise meeting the definition 
of international.86 
The Court’s analysis has been strongly criticized by some 
scholars.87  Notably, the Court did not expressly state its reasoning 
 
 81 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 547, 629 (2006). 
 82  See Milanovic, supra note 80, at 377 (saying that there are several 
possibilities for the Court’s conclusion, including that it rested on the belief that the 
requirements of Article 3 may apply as a matter of customary law); see also 
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the Supreme Court Get It 
Right?, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1525, 1542 (2007) (stating that Justice Stevens’ use of 
negative inferences in the opinion leaves an open question as to the actual legal 
reasoning behind the application of Common Article 3). 
 83 Milanovic, supra note 80, at 377. 
 84 Id. at 377–78 (noting that it is “remarkable how little support the Court 
actually invokes for such an ahistorical position” as non-international armed 
conflicts have traditionally been limited to internal conflicts occurring in a single 
State). 
 85 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 547, 630 (2006). 
 86 See Eran Shamir-Borer, Revisiting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’s Analysis of the Laws 
of Armed Conflict, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 601, 608 (2007) (describing the Court’s 
approach as adopting a “residual view” of Common Article 3). 
 87 See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for 
Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 190 (2006) 
(asserting that the Court’s reasoning in its conclusion was “weak”).  Some have 
argued that in its reasoning behind the applicability of Common Article 3, the 
Hamdan Court appears to gloss over important historical precedents and, at some 
points, possibly misinterpret cited authorities.  Milanovic, supra note 80, at 379–81.  
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in determining, first, that an armed conflict was in existence88—
although the government had not contested this fact in their brief.89  
The Court also avoided a traditional analysis of the conflict 
according to the Tadić factors—including an examination of the 
relative duration and intensity of hostilities and specific 
characteristics of al-Qaeda, including level of organization and 
command structure—which made it sufficient to trigger Common 
Article 3.90  Additionally, the Court left unresolved the fundamental 
underpinning of their decision on the applicability of Common 
Article 3: is this conflict classification limited to the United States’ 
engagement with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, or is the conflict status 
applicable on a global scale?91   As will be discussed below, the 
United States government itself has generally given the broadest 
reading to this holding. 
2. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S USE OF HAMDAN 
2.1.  Immediate Response and Enduring Influence 
The Hamdan decision had direct and timely effects on the U.S. 
military’s legal positions regarding the war on terror.  One week 
after the opinion was announced, the acting Secretary of Defense 
mandated that military leaders uphold the requirements of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions with regards to the 
 
See also Michael W. Lewis, International Myopia: Hamdan’s Shortcut to “Victory,” 42 
U. RICH. L. REV. 687, 706 (2008) (“The Hamdan court defined armed ‘conflict not of 
an international character,’ determined the requirements of a regularly constituted 
court, and decided what judicial guarantees are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized people in just over five pages . . .  without significantly reviewing the 
drafting history of Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocols.”).  But see Corn, 
Legal Classification of Military Operations, supra note 22, at 78 (stating that Hamdan 
validated the D.C. Circuit Court’s concurrence by Judge Stephen Williams).  Under 
this view, “it is fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of the [law of armed 
conflict] to detach the applicability of regulation from de facto hostilities.”  Id. 
 88 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 73, at 26 (discussing the standards for 
establishing an “armed conflict” under international law). 
 89 Id. 
 90 See supra notes 47–53 and associated text (discussing the wide consensus 
that the Tadić case articulated the proper test for application of Common Article 3).  
The Court did not indicate why it omitted a consideration of those factors in its 
analysis. 
 91 Milanovic, supra note 80, at 377. 
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conflict with al-Qaeda, in compliance with Hamdan. 92   The 
memorandum did not articulate a geographical limit to this now-
categorized conflict.93   Other administration officials appeared to 
take similar views, indicating that the laws of armed conflict—
applicable to non-international conflicts—applied to the hostilities 
with al-Qaeda, without noting State-border limitations. 94  
Statements subsequently made by other government officials—both 
in the Bush and Obama administrations—indicated that the 
classification of the conflict with al-Qaeda had some importance in 
the conduct of hostilities, but the exact legal import of the case was 
unclear.95 
The critical status of Hamdan in the military’s legal construct on 
the war on terror became more discernable with forthcoming 
publications, including the United States Army Judge Advocate 
General’s Legal Center and School’s Law of Armed Conflict 
Deskbook96 and the Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual.97  
These reference books for military law practitioners and 
commanders were notable in several respects as to their treatment 
of Hamdan.  In the Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook, the authors 
continued to define a “non-international armed conflict” in terms of 
the Tadić factors. 98   Confusingly, it also referenced Hamdan in a 
 
 92  See Gordan England, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military 
Departments et al., Application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to 
the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense (July 7, 2006) (noting that 
the Department of Defense generally complied with other aspects of the Geneva 
Conventions even before the ruling). 
 93 Id. (“The Supreme Court has determined that Common Article 3 to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies as a matter of law to the conflict with al-
Qaeda.”). 
 94 For example, in a statement regarding the Hamdan decision, former Legal 
Adviser to the State Department John Bellinger stated that “the Administration 
reads the Hamdan decision to accept that the U.S. is in an armed conflict—and 
therefore that the laws of war are appropriate to apply—but that the armed conflict 
is not of an international character.”  Legal Adviser John B. Bellinger, III, Postings 
on Opinio Juris blog (Jan. 2007), https://www.State.gov/s/l/2007/116111.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E2FF-S5Y5]. 
 95 See, e.g., Speech of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C. 
(Mar. 25, 2010), https://2009-2017.State.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WQB5-AK4U] (“As I have explained, as a matter of 
international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda…. “). 
 96 RICHARD P. DIMEGLIO ET AL., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK (Andrew 
D. Gillman & William J. Johnson eds., 2012) [hereinafter LOAC Deskbook]. 
 97 OFF. OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF DEF. LAW OF WAR MANUAL 
(June 2015) (updated Dec. 2016) [hereinafter Law of War Manual]. 
 98 LOAC Deskbook, supra note 96, at 26. 
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footnote describing a Common Article 3 classification by stating that 
Hamdan stood for the proposition that a non-international armed 
conflict was in contradistinction to a conflict between nations.99  The 
footnote also noted that “Hamdan is significant because the Court 
recognized that a Common Article 3 conflict can expand beyond the 
territory of one particular state.”100  The Court in Hamdan did not 
expressly do this, however—although the holding also did not seem 
to preclude this understanding of a Common Article 3 conflict.  The 
U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual articulated a more 
faithful reading of Hamdan, stating that Common Article 3 reflected 
“minimum standards for humane treatment that apply to all 
military operations.” 101   The Law of War Manual also more 
obviously adopted the “contradistinction” view of non-
international armed conflicts espoused by the decision.102 
The use of Hamdan as precedent for legally justifying military 
activities was further illuminated by the Department of Justice’s 
(DOJ) White Paper on Targeted Killing103 and associated Office of 
Legal Counsel’s (OLC) memorandum on the strike on Anwar al-
Awlaki. 104   The White Paper outlined the DOJ’s legal position 
 
 99 Id. at 25, n. 21. 
 100 Id.  The same concept of a non-international armed conflict was retained in 
subsequent versions.  See DEAN L. WHITFORD ET AL., INT’L AND OPERATIONAL L. DEP’T, 
THE JUDGE ADVOC. GEN. LEGAL CTR. & SCH., L. OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 25–27 
(William J. Johnson & David H. Lee eds., 2014), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8JHG-8G2H]; RYAN DOWDY ET AL., INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW 
DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOC. GEN. LEGAL CTR. & SCH., L. OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 
25–26 (Rachel S. Mangas et al. eds., 2016). 
 101 Law of War Manual, supra note 97, ¶ 8.1.4.1. 
 102 Id. ¶ 3.3.1.  “If two or more States oppose one another, then this type of 
armed conflict is known as an ‘international armed conflict’ because it takes place 
between States. However, a state of war can exist when States are not on opposite 
sides of the conflict. These other types of conflict are described as ‘not of an 
international character’ or ‘non-international armed conflict.’” Id. (citing Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006)). 
 103 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. 
Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force (Nov. 8, 
2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dept-
white-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/72SS-S363] [hereinafter DOJ White Paper]. 
 104 Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Att’y Gen., Applicability of Federal 
Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against 
Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter OLC Memo].  The White Paper 
was drafted for Congressional lawmakers after they had requested access to the al-
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
348 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:2 
regarding the use of lethal force against an American citizen located 
in a foreign State, outside the primary area of active hostilities.105  
Similarly, the OLC Memorandum contemplated using lethal force 
against a specific al-Qaeda leader located in Yemen—who was also 
an American citizen.106  The OLC Memorandum cited Hamdan eight 
times in its unredacted text to support legal justifications for the 
strike.107 
According to the DOJ White Paper: 
 . . . [T]he United States retains its authority to use force 
against al-Qa’ida and associated forces outside the area of 
active hostilities when it targets a senior operational leader 
of the enemy forces who is actively engaged in planning 
operations to kill Americans.  The United States is currently 
in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qa’ida and its 
associated forces.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 
628-31 (2006) (holding that a conflict between a nation and a 
transnational non-state actor, occurring outside the nation’s 
territory, is an armed conflict “not of an international 
character” (quoting Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions) because it is not a “clash between nations”).  
Any U.S. operation would be part of this non-international 
armed conflict, even if it were to take place away from the 
zone of active hostilities.108 
This legal opinion shows that the United States government 
applied the Hamdan holding to a broad, global context, in which 
conflict classification “attached” to members of the non-State armed 
group, irrespective of location. 
 
Awlaki memo, which, at that time, was classified.  The White Paper was officially 
released by the DOJ in 2013 shortly after it was leaked to NBC News.  See Charlie 
Savage, DoJ White Paper on Killing Citizens Deemed Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 
2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/24/us/killingcitizenswhitepape
r.html [https://perma.cc/P9WL-6PSY].  The redacted OLC memorandum was 
later released as a result of litigation.  Thomas Earnest, DOJ OLC Targeted Killing 
Memo Released, JUST SECURITY (June 23, 2014), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/12078/doj-olc-targeted-killing-memo-released/ 
[https://perma.cc/LZG8-CFR5]. 
 105 DOJ White Paper, supra note 103, at 1. 
 106 OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 21.  Al-Awlaki was a leader in al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  Id. 
 107 Id. at 24, 26–28. 
 108 DOJ White Paper, supra note 103, at 3. 
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Likewise, the OLC Memorandum espoused an expansive view 
of the meaning of Hamdan: 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the 
United States is engaged in a non-international armed 
conflict with al-Qaida . . . Here, unlike in Hamdan, the 
contemplated DoD operation would occur in Yemen, a 
location that is far from the most active theater of combat 
between the United States and al-Qaida.  That does not affect 
our conclusion, however, that the combination of facts 
present here would make the DoD operation in Yemen part 
of the non-international armed conflict with al-Qaida.  To be 
sure, Hamdan did not directly address the geographic scope 
of the non-international armed conflict between the United 
States and al-Qaida that the Court recognized, other than to 
implicitly hold that it extended to Afghanistan, where 
Hamdan was apprehended.  The Court did, however, 
specifically reject the argument that non-international armed 
conflicts are necessarily limited to internal conflicts . . . The 
Court explained that this interpretation—that the nature of 
the conflict depends at least in part on the status of the 
parties, rather than simply on the locations in which they 
fight—in turn accords with the view expressed in the 
commentaries to the Geneva Conventions that “the scope of 
application” of Common Article 3, which establishes basic 
protections that govern conflicts not of an international 
character, “must be as wide as possible.”109 
This excerpt shows that the OLC read Hamdan permissively—
allowing the conflict classification to reach beyond the borders of 
Afghanistan, although the Court did not directly state such.110  The 
memorandum did acknowledge strong scholarly and international 
opposition for this position, but ultimately found it unconvincing.111  
 
 109 OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 24 (internal citations omitted).  The opinion 
was careful to restrict its application to Yemen, however.  Id. at n. 30. 
 110  Later, the OLC Memo states that “[t]here is little judicial or other 
authoritative precedent that speaks directly to the question of the geographic scope 
of a non-international armed conflict in which one of the parties is a transnational, 
non-State actor and where the principal theater of operations is not within the 
territory of the nation that is a party to the conflict.”  Id. at 25. 
 111 Id. at 25 (citing Mary Ellen O’Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 
U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 857–59 (2009); Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions ¶ 54 (U.N.H.R.C., Fourteenth Session, 
Agenda Item 3, May 28, 2010)). 
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The OLC Memorandum excerpt above also used Hamdan for the 
proposition that the status of the parties to the conflict is of greater 
importance than geographical location for purposes of conflict 
classification. 112   In effect, the Hamdan Court’s highly inclusive 
categorization of what constitutes a non-international armed 
conflict was further widened and applied outside of the context of 
Afghanistan by the executive branch in both legal opinions.  
Nothing in the Hamdan Court’s analysis limited this interpretation. 
After establishing the operation was indeed a part of the larger 
non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the OLC 
Memorandum then considered whether the proposed operation 
would comply with the applicable laws of war.113  Admitting that 
the Geneva Conventions did not themselves establish robust 
restrictions on conduct for non-international armed conflicts, the 
memorandum went on to assert that the rules within the treaties 
were not “exclusive” since the “laws and customs of war also 
impose limitations on the conduct of participants...” 114   This 
statement is notable, as the government here specifically linked 
qualification of an armed conflict under Common Article 3, as 
categorized by Hamdan, and the resulting trigger of the customary 
rules of war, including targeting.  The government thus made the 
treaty qualification of a “conflict not of an international character” 
and the associated application of base-line humanitarian protections 
of Common Article 3 congruent with the triggering of the customary 
jus in bello115 rules of armed conflict.  Although reflecting a long-
understood view, this conclusion is not an entirely clear one under 
international law.116  The assertion rationally extrapolated from the 
 
 112 The Hamdan Court did not discuss the qualities of al-Qaeda which made it 
a proper party to a non-international conflict in any detail.  It did conclude, 
however, that the phrase “not of an international character” applied when one of 
the parties to a conflict was not a State.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 
(2006). 
 113 OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 27–28. 
 114 Id. at 28 (citing Submission of the Government of the U.S. (July 17, 1995) at 
33, n. 53, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-1).  
 115 Or, the laws that govern how hostilities are conducted.  Int’l Comm. of the 
Red Cross, Jus in bello – Jus ad bellum, https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/ihl-
other-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello-jus-ad-bellum [https://perma.cc/66RL-YUTP]. 
 116 See Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The 
Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 295, 301 
(Aug. 16, 2012) (stating that although Common Articles 2 and 3 do not explicitly 
state that they establish the triggers for the customary law of war, “they rapidly 
evolved to create such an effect”) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Corn, 
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conclusion of the Hamdan Court, which ostensibly spoke to detainee 
treatment only, and not the concomitant application of the entire 
framework of customary laws that apply in non-international armed 
conflicts.117 
Importantly, the Hamdan Court did not appear to contemplate 
that its reasoning would result in the broad application of this body 
of customary law.118  In contrast, other international court decisions 
have specifically invoked the customary law of armed conflict in 
conjunction with the application of Common Article 3.  In Nicaragua 
 
Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities]; see also Sasha Radin, Global Armed 
Conflict? The Threshold of Extraterritorial Non-International Armed Conflicts, 89 INT’L L. 
STUD. 696, 706 (2013) (“This article takes the position that the criteria triggering the 
application of Common Article 3 are the same as those required by customary 
international law to establish the existence of a [non-international armed 
conflict] . . . to conclude otherwise would create an additional category of conflict, 
an outcome that is generally rejected.”).  The precise threshold for triggering this 
area of customary international law is unclear.  See Noëlle Quénivet, Applicability 
Test of Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3 for Crimes in Internal Armed Conflict, 
in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL 
BODIES 41 (Derek Jinks et al. eds., 2014) (“Regrettably for us there is not readily 
available answer to the question of whether international customary law provides 
for a single definition of non-international armed conflict.”).  In other words, while 
the substantive provisions in Common Article 3 are widely accepted as being 
grounded in customary law, the triggering mechanism for the article may not 
necessarily reflect customary law.  In their landmark 2011 study of the customary 
rules applicable in warfare, the ICRC failed to address an issue of seeming central 
importance:  what is the customary law understanding of “armed conflict”? Id.  
When asked about this oversight, an ICRC legal advisor responded that such an 
answer would have required a study of its own.  Id. (citing Malcolm McLauren & 
Felix Schwendimann, An exercise in the development of international law: the new ICRC 
study on customary international humanitarian law, 6 GER. L. J. 1217, 1227 (2005)). 
 117 See Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities, supra note 116, 
at 325–26 (“[T]his holding is limited by one critical reality: the gap it filled related 
only to the principle of humane treatment.  Nothing in that opinion addressed the 
applicability of the other foundational principles of the law of war to extraterritorial 
non-state armed conflicts.“); see also Aolain, supra note 82, at 1548 (noting that the 
Court failed to address specifically what elements of the law of war apply to the 
conflict with al-Qaeda). 
 118  It is unclear the extent to which the Court considered customary 
international law in arriving at its opinion.  The majority did briefly discuss the 
customary norms encapsulated by Article 75 of Additional Protocol I and its impact 
on interpreting Common Article 3 (see infra note 123).  Four justices, including 
Justice Stevens, also invoked customary international law in concluding that the 
conspiracy charge against Hamdan was not a law of war violation.  Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 610 (2006).  Professors Julian Ku and John Yoo have 
categorized Justice Stevens’s interpretation of customary international law in the 
opinion as “lack[ing] a consistent interpretive methodology.”  Julian Ku & John 
Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the 
Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 194 (2006). 
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v. U.S.,119 for example, the International Court of Justice concluded 
that Common Article 3 applied to the conflict at issue not by virtue 
of treaty law, but through the application of customary international 
law.120  The court therefore included Common Article 3 within the 
broad set of customary rules that govern in the case of all conflicts.121  
In Hamdan, however, the Court did not seem to apply Common 
Article 3 by virtue of customary law, or make any meaningful 
determination about the status of customary law in the conflict.122  
Justice Stevens discussed the “laws of war” at several points, but 
never made a comprehensive assessment of what parts of the laws 
of war applied in the case specifically, or the conflict generally.123  
Some scholars question whether Justice Stevens, the author of the 
majority opinion, fully realized the expansive nature of customary 
law within the corpus of the law of war.124   Despite the Court’s 
decision to wade into the waters of international law, the Court gave 
neither a detailed nor comprehensive explanation of the limits or 
effects of its holding in terms of customary norms. 
 
 119 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, 14 (June 27, 1986). 
 120 Aolain, supra note 82, at 1545. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 1548 (noting that Justice Stevens’s approach leaves unanswered the 
fundamental question of “which elements of the law of war apply to the conflict?”).  
The Court did make mention of customary international law in conjunction with 
one of its specific conclusions regarding Common Article 3, stating that its 
requirement that trial procedures provide “all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples” must be “understood to 
incorporate at least the barest of those trial protections that have been recognized 
by customary international law.”  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006).  
The Court went on to note that many of those protections are contained in Article 
75 of Additional Protocol I, which the United States has not ratified.  Id.  Despite the 
fact that the United States had not ratified that treaty, the Court concluded the 
provisions should be applicable nonetheless because the government did not 
express objections specifically regarding Article 75.  Id.  The Court, then, did 
specifically apply customary international law in conjunction with its application 
of Common Article 3 in this limited context.  Id. at 634. 
 123 Id. at 634. 
 124 According to Professors Julian Ku and John Yoo, Justice Stevens’ analysis 
“also demonstrates the majority’s lack of capacity in a highly technical area long 
given to the political branches.  Justice Stevens missed the fundamental point that 
much of the law of war is customary, not written.”  Ku & Yoo, supra note 118, at 
194. It is not evident, then, that the Court was aware that by concluding that the 
triggering threshold was met for Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, it 
was also implicitly invoking the entire body of customary law applicable to armed 
conflicts, including targeting rules. 
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The outcome of Hamdan, of course, did not settle the issue of 
conflict classification or laws of targeting for other nations, or for 
many scholars.125  Nonetheless, the opinion has since been heavily 
relied upon in the last dozen years by the United States government 
in legally justifying the use of lethal force.  These documents assert 
that Hamdan serves as legal precedent for the proposition that the 
law of armed conflict’s customary laws of targeting apply in 
situations where military forces engage with al-Qaeda, seemingly 
regardless of location or nature of hostilities in that location.  This 
Article next examines targeting rules under the law of armed conflict 
and how Hamdan is essential in giving legal legitimacy to current 
combat activities. 
2.2. Jus in Bello and the Law of Targeting 
  A foundational maxim of the law of armed conflict is that 
“the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited.”126  Ignoring this underlying principle results in arbitrary 
conduct on battlefields. 127   Consequently, the law of targeting 
provides parameters for parties to the conflict as they engage enemy 
personnel and property during armed conflict.  Understanding this 
area of the law will further highlight the significance of Hamdan’s 
conflict classification determination and the resultant triggering of 
customary laws of war.  Specifically, the law of armed conflict 
defines who may not be targeted with deadly force during non-
international conflicts. 
 
 125 See, e.g., Dinstein, Concluding Remarks supra note 54, at 400 (“The idea that 
a [non-international armed conflict] can be global in nature is oxymoronic: an 
armed conflict can be a [non-international armed conflict] and it can be global, but 
it cannot be both.”);  see also Jens David Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?, 11 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 27, 29–31 (2013); Jordan J. Paust, Propriety of Self-Defense Targetings of 
Members of Al Qaeda and Applicable Principles of Distinction and Proportionality, 18 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 565, 566–67 (2012); Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. 
Gov’t of Israel, HCJ 769/02 (2006) (determining that the conflict between Israel and 
Palestinian terror organizations constituted an international armed conflict, in 
seeming disagreement with Hamdan).  The ICRC has also consistently disagreed 
that a global non-international armed conflict exists.  See Jelena Pejic, The Protective 
Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 189, 196 
(2011). 
 126 Hague Regulation IV, supra note 24, at art. 22. 
 127 See MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 391 (1959). 
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2.2.1. Origins of the Law of Targeting 
The origins of this area of the law lie in the various treaties 
regulating the means and methods of warfare.  The Lieber Code, 
drafted by Francis Lieber during the American Civil War, was one 
of the first compilations of existing laws and customs of war.128  
Although this code was domestic in nature, it significantly 
influenced subsequent international treaties including the 1899 and 
1907 Hague Conventions.129  Specifically, Convention IV, commonly 
referred to as Hague IV, codified principles such as military 
necessity and unnecessary suffering.130  Many of these conventions 
were incorporated and clarified in the Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions.131  Additional Protocol I, also known as AP I, 
filled many of the gaps in the international law governing targeting 
and incorporated existing principles from previous treaties.  
Additionally, AP I defined principles and terms that are significant 
to the law of targeting.132  While the United States is not a party to 
AP I, the basic principles of targeting are viewed as customary 
international law and applicable to not only international armed 
conflicts but also non-international armed conflicts.133 
 
 128 See David Wallace & Shane Reeves, Modern Weapons and the Law of Armed 
Conflict, U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 172 (Corn et al. eds., 
2015). 
 129 See Howard S. Levie, History of the Law of War on Land, INT’L REV. RED CROSS, 
No. 838 (2000). 
 130 See Annex to Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295. 
 131 See SOLIS, supra note 27, at 122 (“With Additional Protocol I, the bulk of the 
customary law of war has become formalized.”). 
 132 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. 
 133  See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN L., THE MANUAL ON 
THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 1.2 (2006) [hereinafter NIAC 
MANUAL]; see also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 63 (2009). 
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2.2.2. Targeting in Non-international Armed Conflicts 
The basic principles of targeting include military necessity, 
distinction, proportionality, and the prevention of unnecessary 
suffering.  These principles, along with the rules related to 
precautions in the attack, guide all targeting decisions during armed 
conflict.  Of these, distinction, proportionality, and precautions have 
particular significance in armed conflicts against non-State actors 
such as al-Qaeda.134  The principle of distinction requires parties to 
the conflict to “distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.”135 
Under the principle of proportionality, “an attack is forbidden if 
it may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.” 136   The analysis is based on damage or 
injury that is anticipated, not the amount that actually occurs.137 
Precautions in the attack, like proportionality, are focused on 
protecting the civilian population and require those who plan 
attacks to “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be 
attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject 
to special protection.”138  Also, planners are required to “take all 
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack 
with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian 
 
 134 Much of the debate surrounding the use of human shields by non-State 
actors in Iraq and Syria centers on distinction, proportionality and precautions.  See 
Adil Ahmad Haque, Off Target: Selection, Precaution, and Proportionality in the DoD 
Manual, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 31 (2016); Marty Lederman, Thoughts on Distinction and 
Proportionality in the December 2016 Revision to the Law of War Manual, JUST SECURITY 
(Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/35617/thoughts-distinction-
proportionality-december-2016-revision-law-war-manual/ 
[https://perma.cc/V7JG-H5U5]. 
 135 AP I, supra note 132, at art. 48. 
 136  See MICHAEL N. SCHMITT ET AL., THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY ¶ 2.1.1.4; see also AP I, supra 
note 132, at art. 51(b). 
 137  YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 121 (2004). 
 138 See AP I, supra note 132, at art. 57(2)(a). 
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objects.” 139   As stated above, these principles and rules are 
customary international law and apply during Common Article 3 
conflicts.140 
2.2.3. Targeting Individuals in Non-international Armed 
Conflicts 
Determining who may be lawfully targeted in a non-
international conflict is not as simple as in an international armed 
conflict, where combatants are presumably distinguishable on the 
battlefield.  Unlike international armed conflicts where the status of 
combatants and civilians is defined in AP I, the character of the 
parties is not defined in Common Article 3.  In the case of non-
international armed conflicts, 141  neither Common Article 3 nor 
Additional Protocol II142 defines the term “civilian” or “combatant,” 
but the protocol does mention organized armed groups.143  Without 
a clear legal delineation of the status of individuals in non-
 
 139 Id. 
 140 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No.IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); NIAC MANUAL, supra note 133, ¶ 1.2 (2006).  See 
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 133, at 63. 
 141 See Michael N. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters in Non-International 
Armed Conflict, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 119, 120 (2011) [hereinafter Schmitt, Status of 
Opposition Fighters].  Professor Schmitt writes, “Textually, the article merely refers 
to “persons taking no active part in hostilities,” including “members of the armed 
forces” who are hors de combat.  The reference is somewhat useful in that it suggests 
a normative distinction between those who actively participate in a non-
international armed conflict and those who do not.  Yet, the failure to address party 
status directly is unfortunate, for it begs the question of when non-State individuals 
or groups qualify as a party.”  Id. 
 142  AP II, supra note 41.  Protocol II also establishes robust and detailed 
parameters for the lawful conduct of hostilities in a non-international armed 
conflict.  However, the United States has not ratified this treaty. Moreover, the 
trigger for Protocol II is not consistent with the threshold of application for 
Common Article 3.  Additional Protocol II “has a much more narrow field of 
application than Common Article 3.” DEREK JINKS, September 11 and the Laws of War, 
28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 26 (2003) (citing the text of the two provisions, drafting history 
of Additional Protocol II, and history of State practice).  For example, Protocol II 
requires the non-State armed group to exercise a degree of control over territory.  
Id. 
 143 AP II, supra note 41, art 1. 
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international conflicts, 144  compliance with the principle of 
distinction becomes a challenge for military planners and 
commanders.  Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude “that two 
broad categories of non-international armed conflict participants lie 
in juxtaposition: civilians and organized armed groups.” 145  
Furthermore, the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance states that “as the 
wording and logic of [Common Article 3] and Additional Protocol 
II reveals, civilians, armed forces, and organized armed groups of 
the parties to the conflict are mutually exclusive categories also in 
non-international armed conflict.” 146   Consequently, given the 
language of Common Article 3 and the Interpretive Guidance, lethal 
force can only be lawfully directed against members of organized 
armed groups and civilians who take an active part in hostilities. 
During a non-international armed conflict, then, a civilian 
directly participating in hostilities is not protected from lethal 
targeting. 147   This precept brings up several challenges of 
interpretation, however.  One issue is dealing with individuals 
whose activities are categorized as “farmer by day, fighter by 
night.”148  The actual parameters of this debate149 are beyond the 
scope of this Article, but it is well accepted that there are 
circumstances during armed conflicts where civilians may lawfully 
 
 144 See SEAN M. WATTS, Present and Future Conceptions of the Status of Government 
Forces in Non-International Armed Conflict, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 145, 146 (2012), 
https://digital-
commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=ils 
[https://perma.cc/8QHR-DF3T] (“Whereas the protections and obligations of the 
law of [International Armed Conflicts] are premised almost entirely on the status 
of affected persons, the law of [Non-international Armed Conflicts] spurns such 
classifications, as well as the [International Armed Conflict] taxonomy of status-
based protection generally.”). 
 145 See Schmitt, Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 141, at 120. 
 146 Id. at 128 (citing NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law 32 (2009) [hereinafter Interpretive Guidance]). 
 147 See Common Article 3 provides protections for “[p]ersons taking no active 
part in the hostilities.”; GC II, supra note 26, at art. 3 (stating that the law of armed 
conflict does not provide authorization to target, rather it provides legal protection 
for persons playing no active role in the conflict). 
 148  Charles Garraway, Direct Participation and the Principle of Distinction: 
Squaring the Circle, in CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LAWS OF WAR 180 
(Caroline Harvey et al. eds., 2014). 
 149 Id. at 181; compare Interpretive Guidance, supra note 146, at 78, with Michael 
N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: 
A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC’Y J. 5 (2010), https://harvardnsj.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/13/2015/01/Vol.-1_Schmitt_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GWQ5-U63Q]. 
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be targeted based on their conduct alone, irrespective of 
membership in an armed group. 150   Such persons are subject to 
attack only for the limited time they are actually involved in 
hostilities.151 
Individuals who are members of armed groups may also lose 
their protected status and be lawfully targeted under the law of 
armed conflict.  There is serious disagreement, however, over 
whether all members of a non-State armed group may be targeted, 
or only a certain subset.152  There are two approaches to this issue.  
One approach, asserted by the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance, 
permits the lethal targeting of members of organized armed groups 
who have a continuous combat function. 153   The Interpretive 
Guidance states that: 
[f]or the practical purposes of the principle of distinction, 
therefore, membership in such groups cannot depend on 
abstract affiliation, family ties, or other criteria prone to 
error, arbitrariness or abuse.  Instead, membership must 
depend on whether the continuous function assumed by an 
individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the 
group as a whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on behalf 
of a non-State party to the conflict.  Consequently, under 
IHL, the decisive criterion for individual membership in an 
organized armed group is whether a person assumes a 
continuous function for the group involving his or her direct 
participation in hostilities.154 
Under this perspective, an individual who is a member of an 
armed group may only be targeted if that person’s specific activities 
fulfill the continuous combat function criteria.  This approach has 
 
 150  See, e.g. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 146, at 46–64 (stating that a 
person is considered to be directly participating in hostilities when the activity at 
issue is directly related to a particular harm, the harm reaches a requisite threshold, 
and there is a belligerent nexus). 
 151 Id. at 71. 
 152  Schmitt, Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 141, at 120; E. Corrie 
Westbrook Mack & Shane R. Reeves, Tethering the Law of Armed Conflict to 
Operational Practice: “Organized Armed Group” Membership in the Age of ISIS, 36 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 355, 337 (2018) (“What remains unsettled is when an individual 
is a targetable member of such a group.”). 
 153 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 146, at 33. 
 154 Id. 
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been criticized by other scholars for its “inequity in the law”155 as it 
appears to shield certain members of non-State armed groups from 
lethal attack, where similar members of State armed forces are valid 
targets in an international armed conflict.156 
A different approach seeks to “comport[] with the underlying 
logic of the distinction between civilians and organized armed 
groups.”157  This approach proposes lethal targeting of members of 
organized armed groups “so long as they remain active members of 
the group, regardless of their function.”158  Such active membership 
can be confirmed through various sources of intelligence.159  The 
United States military has adopted this second, broader, approach 
to combatant classification in its doctrine. 160   According to the 
American military understanding of this area of the law of war, an 
individual who has been identified as being a member of a non-State 
armed group may generally be targeted at any time, regardless of 
specific activities.161  The United States’ position on lethal targeting 
any member of a non-State armed group, coupled with its 
classification of the global conflict against al-Qaeda as a global non-
international armed conflict is particularly critical when considering 
 
 155  Schmitt, Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 141, at 133 (“[B]y the 
proposed standard, direct attack on a member of an organized armed group 
without a continuous combat function is prohibited . . . , but a member of the State’s 
armed forces who performs no combat-related duties may be attacked at any 
time.”). 
 156 Id.  For example, an individual performing duties as a cook in al-Qaeda 
would not be targetable under this framework, but a cook in the armed forces of a 
State may be targeted at any time in an international armed conflict. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Law of War Manual, supra note 97, at 220 (“Membership in the armed 
forces or belonging to an armed group makes a person liable to being made the 
object of attack regardless of whether he or she is taking a direct part in hostilities. 
This is because the organization’s hostile intent may be imputed to an individual 
through his or her association with the organization.”).  According to the American 
military position, the fact that an individual is a member of such a non-State group 
may be ascertained by formal indicia, including that the person took an oath or 
wears a uniform, or may be gleaned by indirect criteria such as evidence that the 
person has followed orders, entered facilities operated by the non-State group, or, 
in some cases travelled with members of that group.  Id.  at 222. 
 161 See id. 220–24 (noting that this status-based targeting classification ceases 
when individuals have been placed hors de combat—are out of the fight because of 
injury, capture, or surrender—or ties with the armed group have been severed). 
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targeting individuals away from “central” battlefields such as 
Afghanistan.162 
2.2.4. The Geographic Scope of Targeting Rules 
Whether the laws of armed conflict should apply outside of State 
of most active hostilities—the “hot battlefield”—in the case of a non-
international armed conflict, is an area of contention among 
scholars.163  Some posit that the laws of armed conflict should only 
apply in limited areas, where armed groups are engaged in intense 
fighting.164   The ICRC takes the position that the laws of armed 
conflict may extend beyond the hot battlefield into adjacent 
territories, to ensure actors are not able to evade the rules by crossing 
 
 162 It is not evident from the DOJ White Paper or OLC Memo whether this 
broad understanding of who may be lawfully targeted was relied upon.  For 
example, the DOJ White Paper consistently describes the potential target as a 
“senior operational leader of the enemy forces who is actively engaged in planning 
operations to kill Americans.”  DOJ White Paper, supra note 103, at 3.  It is unclear 
whether the conduct of this individual plays a role in the legal opinion authorizing 
attack, or whether the opinion rests on the individual’s membership in an armed 
group.  The paper does quote the ICRC Commentary on Protocol II in the paragraph 
immediately before this, stating “[t]hose who belong to armed forces or armed 
groups may be attacked at any time.”  Id.  In the OLC memorandum, the legal 
reasoning authorizing the use of force on al Awlaki seems to be based somewhat 
on the fact that he has played a continuing role of planning attacks from his Yemeni 
base.  OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 27.  It is uncertain, though, whether this is 
meaningful in calculating whether al Awlaki is a valid target under the laws armed 
conflict, or whether the conflict classification attaches, geographically, to Yemen.  It 
is possible that the emphasis on a continuing threat language is pertinent to a 
domestic authority to target, rather than an international one.  See Wells Bennett, A 
Clue About the Origins of “Imminence” in the OLC Memo, LAWFARE (June 25, 2014, 
10:37 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/clue-about-origins-imminence-olc-
memo [https://perma.cc/TL5M-JJXE]. 
 163 Michael Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of Non-international Armed 
Conflict, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 8–18 (2014) [hereinafter Schmitt, Charting the Legal 
Geography].  See, e.g., Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework 
for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 
1167–70 (highlighting the parameters of the debate); Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-
1192 (D.D.C. July 18, 2012), 2012 WL 3024212 at 2 (discussing the risks of lethal 
targetings “outside the context of armed conflict, in countries including Yemen, 
Somalia, Pakistan, Sudan, and the Philippines”). 
 164  See, e.g., Rise of Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. & Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 3–5 (Apr. 
28, 2010) (written testimony of Mary Ellen O’Connell, Professor, Notre Dame Law 
School), https://fas.org/irp/congress/2010_hr/042810oconnell.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YCD4-FD9S] (asserting that this view also represented the 
position of the International Law Association). 
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a State border. 165   However, the group rejects an expansive 
application of these laws beyond such spill-over conflict. 166  
Individuals acting in geographically dispersed States away from the 
main fighting do not “carry” the law of armed conflict with them, 
under this view.167  Others take the view that the law of armed 
conflict does attach to individuals acting in non-central locations, as 
long as the parties to the conflict qualify under Common Article 3 
and the conflict at issue, as a whole, is of sufficient intensity.168 
Both the DOJ White Paper and OLC Memorandum appeared to 
espouse a version of this last view.169  In discussing the geographic 
scope of the non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda and the 
concern that the laws of war be given “appropriate application,”170 
the OLC Memo states “that same consideration, reflected in Hamdan 
itself . . .  suggests a further reason for skepticism about an approach 
that would categorically deny that an operation is part of an armed 
conflict[,] absent a specified level and intensity of hostilities in the 
particular location where it occurs.”171 
Although the OLC Memorandum does not provide an entirely 
transparent framework of its understanding of the geographical 
application of the laws of war, it does indicate that the level of 
hostilities within the relevant location is not an important 
criterion.172  The United States government, then, has used Hamdan 
to support its legal position that the laws of targeting apply even in 
 
 165 See Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography, supra note 163, at 11. 
 166 Id. at 15. 
 167 Id. (discussing the ICRC’s view that operations that are conducted within 
the territory of a nonbelligerent state should be governed by rules concerning law 
enforcement operations). 
 168 Id. at 16. 
 169 See supra notes 108, 110 and accompanying text. 
 170 OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 26–27. 
 171 Id.  See also id. at 24 (suggesting that the memo seems to be referencing an 
earlier statement that the Hamdan Court was concerned with giving the broadest 
possible application to Common Article 3). 
 172 On the other hand, the OLC Memorandum does indicate that the quality 
of the group’s presence in an area may be a relevant consideration.  See OLC Memo, 
supra note 104, at 27 (stating that “AQAP has a significant and organized presence” 
in Yemen); see also Ryan Goodman, The OLC’s Drone Memo and International Law’s 
Ascendance, JUST SECURITY (June 24, 2014), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/12142/olc-memo-drones-international-law-
goodman/ [https://perma.cc/M6NP-PZGB] (stating that the memo suggests “that 
the authorization to use lethal force may apply only in areas with a significant 
presence and staging ground for enemy forces and from where attacks against the 
United States are launched.”). 
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geographically dispersed areas, including Yemen, placing it at odds 
with groups such as the ICRC who would limit such application.  
This line of reasoning would presumably apply to other areas, such 
as Somalia and Pakistan, where the United States has conducted 
hundreds of drone strikes in recent years.173  As the Hamdan Court 
did not articulate a geographic scope to its conflict classification 
holding, nor address the issues of necessary duration and intensity 
of hostilities, in order for Common Article 3 to apply in a given 
area—the decision does not clearly preclude the United States’ legal 
position. 
Another issue that seems to be assumed in the government’s 
position in the DOJ White Paper and OLC Memorandum is the 
cohesiveness of groups belonging under the al-Qaeda 
organizational umbrella.  One critique is that they assume that “al-
Qaeda and its associated forces” qualify as a single armed group.174  
Scholars point out that the splinter terror groups that have 
allegiances with al-Qaeda do not clearly exhibit a unifying 
command structure which would be sufficient to qualify them as a 
part of the global non-international armed conflict.175  At least one 
former Department of Defense official has articulated a robust set of 
requirements for “associated forces” to be considered as such.176  
The articulated position does not require a unified chain of 
command with al-Qaeda, however.  Again, because the specific 
qualities of al-Qaeda—including organizational structure—were 
not addressed in Hamdan, the decision does not seem to restrain a 
broad reading here by the executive branch. 
 
 173 See Micah Zenko, Obama’s Final Drone Strike Data, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/blog/obamas-final-drone-strike-
data [https://perma.cc/CZ45-7LR6]. 
 174 See Kevin Jon Heller, The DoJ White Paper’s Fatal International Law Flaw—
Organization, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 5, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/02/05/the-
doj-white-papers-fatal-international-law-flaw/ [https://perma.cc/828E-7RNR]. 
 175 Id. (“The assumption that ‘al-Qa’ida and its associated forces’ constitute a 
single organized armed group for purposes of [international law] . . . deeply 
problematic.”).  But see Peter Margulies, Networks in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts: Crossing Borders and Defining “Organized Armed Group,” 89 INT’L L. STUD. 
54, 55 (2013) (stating that al-Qaeda exhibits a “surprising degree of organization,” 
considering the unconventional factors endemic to terrorist networks—creating a 
sufficient justification for targeting affiliates). 
 176 See Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., National Security 
Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama Administration, Dean’s Lecture at 
Yale Law School (Feb. 22, 2012) in 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV., 141, 146 (2012) (noting 
that the Department of Defense requires that the armed group be organized, have 
fought alongside al-Qaeda, and be considered a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda in 
order to qualify under this phrase). 
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2.2.5. The Law of Armed Conflict versus Human Rights Law 
The United States government’s reliance on Hamdan in its 
assertion that it is engaged in a global non-international armed 
conflict against al-Qaeda is therefore of critical importance.  In the 
absence of an “armed conflict” classification, more restrictive 
customary international human rights law would apply, 177 
specifically to areas away from the central battlefield.  The limits 
regarding the targeting of individuals are quite different between 
the two paradigms.  International human rights law limits the 
targeting of individuals only when “strictly unavoidable to protect 
life.”178  Further, “it is never permissible for killing to be the sole 
objective of an operation” under human rights law. 179   This law 
enforcement framework is thus significantly more restrictive in 
terms of the use of force than the law of armed conflict.  Further, 
rules for detention are more tolerant under the law of armed 
conflict.180 
With the use of Hamdan, however, the United States government 
maintains it is operating lawfully under the more permissive laws 
of armed conflict, including status-based targeting rules.  The 
executive branch has stretched the inclusive holding of Hamdan to 
apply the Common Article 3 classification to geographic locations 
outside of Afghanistan.  The nature of hostilities in those locations 
is irrelevant, as long as an individual is a member of al-Qaeda or an 
associated force.  Thus, according to its view, the customary laws of 
war apply to the conflict with al-Qaeda and its associates on a global 
scale.  This understanding indicates that individuals may be 
lawfully attacked based on their status as members of al-Qaeda or 
an associated group, at any time, worldwide. 
 
 177 Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography, supra note 163, at 2–3.  See generally 
Ohlin, supra note 125, at 32–36 (explaining the different positions regarding the 
relationship between the lex specialis of international humanitarian law and the lex 
generalis of international human rights law). 
 178 Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography, supra note 163, at 2 (quoting EIGHTH 
UNITED NATIONS CONG. ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF 
OFFENDERS, BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE USE OF FORCE AND FIREARMS BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, at 114, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, Sales No. 
E.91.IV.2 (1990)). 
 179 Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010), 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.
24.Add6.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MHQ-QQ7A]. 
 180 Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography, supra note 163, at 2. 
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2.3. Jus ad Bellum: Sovereignty and the Global Targeting Paradigm 
The above discussion centers on the United States government’s 
use of Hamdan in asserting that rules of targeting apply in any global 
operation involving a member of al-Qaeda or its associated forces—
the jus in bello.  Interestingly, the government has also appeared to 
rely on the decision indirectly when justifying its use of force within 
the sovereign borders of other States—the jus ad bellum. 181   The 
United Nations Charter, which regulates the use of force by party 
nations, expressly states that “[a]ll members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”182  This 
prohibition on the use of force is absolute with only two 
exceptions: 183  if the United Nations Security Council authorizes 
military action184 or if a State is acting under its inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense. 185   Host States, who are 
authorized to internally handle domestic matters, 186  may also 
 
 181 Jus ad bellum outlines the framework for when a State actor may resort to 
armed conflict and is “governed by an important, but distinct, part of international 
law set out in the United Nations Charter.”  GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 
1945 5 (2002); see Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello, 
320 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 533, n.1 (Oct. 31, 1997) (“Jus ad bellum refers to the 
conditions under which one may resort to war or to force in general; jus in bello 
governs the conduct of belligerents during a war, and in a broader sense comprises 
the rights and obligations of neutral parties as well.”).  
 182 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 183 There is an ongoing debate about whether a humanitarian intervention can 
act as a third exception to the United Nations prohibition on the use of force.  See 
generally Shane Reeves, To Russia With Love: How Moral Arguments For A 
Humanitarian Intervention in Syria Opened The Door For An Invasion Of The Ukraine, 
23 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 199, 199–229 (2014) (discussing the question of whether 
the use of force is justified for humanitarian interventions).  However, the concept 
of “humanitarian intervention” has not emerged as customary international law or 
a broadly accepted use of force exception.  See Michael Schmitt & Chris Ford, The 
Use of Force in Response to Syrian Chemical Attacks: Emergence of a New Norm?, JUST 
SECURITY (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39805/force-response-
syrian-chemical-attacks-emergence-norm/ [https://perma.cc/5EM8-46GQ]. 
 184 See U.N. Charter, supra note 182, at art. 42 (discussing when the Security 
Council will consider taking measures that are required to “restore international 
peace and security”). 
 185 Id. art. 51. 
 186 Id. art. 2, ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter…. “). 
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consent to a State using force within its sovereign territory.187  As the 
territorial integrity or political independence of the host State is not 
violated in these circumstances, a “use of force” exception is not 
required.188  As a result, if a nation requests assistance from another 
State, that State may lawfully use force within the borders of the 
requesting country.189 
The United States relies heavily on the consent of a host nation 
to gain access to territory for targeting purposes.  For example, since 
2002, the conflict between the Afghan government and the Taliban 
has been non-international; the United States takes part by 
invitation.190  As a consensual participant in this territorial civil war, 
the United States targets the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and associates on 
behalf of the Afghanistan government.  In 2011, Yemen gave the 
United States permission for the drone strike that killed Anwar al-
Awlaki.191  Taken together with the jus in bello analysis, as described 
in the previous section, the United States may, therefore, lethally 
target a member of al-Qaeda anywhere a host nation gives consent.  
Thus, the United States could kill a member of al-Qaeda sitting in a 
café in Paris, assuming the French consent and the strike is 
otherwise in compliance with the law of armed conflict.192 
 
 187 See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third 
Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 20, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 
 188 LOAC DESKBOOK, supra note 96, at 31 n.7. 
 189 See CORN, supra note 17, at 17. 
 190 When the United States launched the military campaign against the de 
facto government of Afghanistan—the Taliban—on October 7, 2001, the conflict 
was international.  See Robin Geib & Michael Siegrist, Has the Armed Conflict in 
Afghanistan Affected the Rules on the Conduct of Hostilities?, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
11, 13–15 (Mar. 2011).  However, the June 19, 2002 establishment of a new Afghan 
Transitional Administration transitioned the continuing conflict with the Taliban 
from international to non-international.  See id. at 15–16. 
 191 See Shane Reeves & Jeremy Marsh, Bin Laden and Awlaki: Lawful Targets, 
HARV. INT’L REV., (Oct. 26, 2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2297061 
[https://perma.cc/QH4E-W3HA].  The strike on al-Awlaki preceded the ongoing 
Yemeni civil war that began in March 2015.  Joseph Hincks, What You Need to Know 
About the Crisis in Yemen, TIME (Nov 3, 2016), http://time.com/4552712/yemen-
war-humanitarian-crisis-famine/ [https://perma.cc/V7YR-FCJB]. 
 192 Aside from compliance with the law of targeting, the status of the al-Qaeda 
member would also need to be assessed.  See generally Schmitt, Status of Opposition 
Fighters, supra note 141 (discussing the different statuses that may apply to 
opposition fighters). 
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In conjunction with the self-defense justification, the United 
States has adopted the “unwilling or unable” theory of self-
defense.193  Under this theory, a State may use:  
force in self-defense against a non-state actor on the territory 
of a third State, without the consent of that third State . . . if 
the non-state actor has undertaken an armed attack against 
the State and the third State is itself unwilling or unable to 
address the threat posed by the non-state actor.194   
The United States most famously relied on the “unwilling or unable” 
theory of self-defense to justify violating the sovereignty of Pakistan 
in the 2011 operation to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden.195  This 
position has subsequently been supported, either explicitly or 
implicitly, by a host of additional State actors.196 
At first blush, the Court’s expansive interpretation of Common 
Article 3 in Hamdan did not appear to implicate the United States’ 
legal authority to use force within or against another nation.197  In 
seemingly acknowledging a non-international armed conflict with 
al-Qaeda, the Court left unaddressed how this determination might 
affect the ability to use force against members of al-Qaeda inside the 
borders of another sovereign State.  In fact, however, the 
relationship between a globalized conflict with a non-State actor and 
a State’s right to self-defense became interestingly intertwined in the 
government’s jus ad bellum justifications. 
In a 2011 speech, John Brennan, Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, stated: 
 
 193 See Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework 
for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 485–87 (2012). 
 194  Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, Which States Support the ‘Unwilling or 
Unable’ Test?, LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2016, 1:55 PM).  The “unwilling or unable” theory 
of self-defense has similarities to the concept of humanitarian intervention, in that 
States are perceived as either too weak or too callous to address a threat and thus 
forfeit their sovereignty claim.  See generally Reeves, supra note 183, at 205–12 
(discussing humanitarian intervention in more depth). 
 195 See generally Chachko & Deeks, supra note 194 (discussing when a State is 
unwilling or unable to address a non-State threat within its territory). 
 196 See generally id. (documenting international support for the “unwilling or 
unable” test). 
 197  Hamdan dealt narrowly with an individual detained in Afghanistan, 
where the jus ad bellum justifications for the use of force were well-accepted.  See, 
e.g., Jack M. Beard, America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense under 
International Law, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 559 (2002) (positing that the U.S.’s 
invasion of Afghanistan was a lawful use of force under self-defense). 
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Because we are engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, 
the United States takes the legal position that—in accordance 
with international law—we have the authority to take action 
against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces without doing a 
separate self-defense analysis each time.  And as President 
Obama has stated on numerous occasions, we reserve the 
right to take unilateral action if or when other governments 
are unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions 
themselves.198 
This statement indicates that the self-defense calculation 
necessary under jus ad bellum may be fulfilled by the fact that the 
United States is engaged in a global armed conflict with al-Qaeda.199  
Taken together with other statements by both Bush and Obama 
administration officials, the position may be that the “[jus ad bellum] 
trigger is automatically satisfied more generally based on the 
existence of a continuing [non-international armed conflict].” 200  
That global conflict classification, of course, can ultimately be traced 
back to the holding in Hamdan. 
A full exploration of the legal standards applicable to a self-
defense justification is beyond the scope of this paper—but in 
general, most States and scholars agree that a lawful exertion of self-
defense must be in response to either an actual armed attack, or one 
that is imminent.201  As the above statement indicates, the United 
States position seems to be that the presence of al-Qaeda, in itself, 
without regard to individual activities or threats that the specific 
presence poses, may be sufficient to trigger the right of self-
 
 198 See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, “Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and 
Laws” Program on Law and Security at Harvard Law School, (Sept. 16, 2011), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-
john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an 
[https://perma.cc/H2P9-933B]. 
 199 The Lawfare Institute in cooperation with Brookings, Legality of Targeted 
Killing Program under International Law, LAWFARE, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/legality-targeted-killing-program-under-
international-law [https://perma.cc/KK7F-H94R]. 
 200 Id.  This position appears to be a case of the tail wagging the dog, however, 
and a conflation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 
 201 See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. 
REV. 1620, 1634–35 (1984) (positing that the right to act in self-defense in the case of 
an imminent attack is consistent with the U.N. Charter). 
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defense.202  Similarly, former State Department Legal Advisor Brian 
Egan has stated that once the United States has used force against a 
non-State group in lawful self-defense in the wake of an actual or 
imminent armed attack, it is not legally required to conduct further 
imminence analyses prior to subsequent uses of force.203  Taking a 
slightly different approach, other government officials have stated 
that certain known qualities of how al-Qaeda members operate are 
relevant to any “imminence” assessment.204   In other words, an 
individual’s membership in al-Qaeda is, in itself, a consideration in 
the imminence determination because of the known tactics and 
practices of that non-State armed group.  Additionally, the DOJ 
White Paper appears to weave a jus in bello analysis of what 
constitutes a member of an armed group in its discussion of 
 
 202 See Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by 
Attorney General Eric Holder at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 
2012), https://www.lawfareblog.com/text-attorney-generals-national-security-
speech [https://perma.cc/36JR-FUBC] (stating that the imminence calculation 
would take into account al-Qaeda’s history of carrying out armed attacks, and their 
demonstrated ability to attack with little warning in the future). 
 203 See State Department Legal Adviser Brian Egan, Address at the American 
Society of International Law (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/State-
department-legal-adviser-brian-egans-speech-asil [https://perma.cc/V4BV-5KY9] 
(stating that this is true as long as “hostilities have not ended”); Michael N. Schmitt, 
Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of International Law, 52 
COLUM. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 77, 90 (2013) (describing the legal positions 
surrounding required imminence assessments for subsequent attacks). 
 204  John Brennan stated that various attributes associated with al-Qaeda 
specifically play a role in the imminence analysis: “We are finding increasing 
recognition in the international community that a more flexible understanding of 
“imminence” may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups . . . .  [A]fter 
all, al-Qa’ida does not follow a traditional command structure, wear uniforms, 
carry its arms openly, or mass its troops at the borders of the nations it attacks.  
Nonetheless, it possesses the demonstrated capability to strike with little notice and 
cause significant civilian or military casualties.  Over time, an increasing number of 
our international counterterrorism partners have begun to recognize that the 
traditional conception of what constitutes an “imminent” attack should be 
broadened in light of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and technological 
innovations of terrorist organizations.”  Brennan, supra note 198.  This 
understanding is also reflected in the DOJ White Paper, though the self-defense 
discussion is couched in an examination of constitutional rights, not international 
law.  See DOJ White Paper, supra note 103, at 7–8 (“By its nature, therefore the threat 
posed by al-Qa’ida and its associated forces demands a broader concept of 
imminence in judging when a person continually planning terror attacks presents 
an imminent threat, making the use of force appropriate.”).  For a thorough 
examination of the factors that states consider in the Jus ad Bellum analysis involving 
non-state actors, see Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual 
Armed Attack by NonState Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 770 (2012). 
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imminence. 205   It is difficult to piece together a comprehensive 
position that the United States takes on the jus ad bellum self-defense 
analysis when it comes to non-State actors.206  However, it is evident 
from the above examples that membership in the al-Qaeda 
organization is important to this analysis.  That the global armed 
conflict with al-Qaeda is somehow defined under international law, 
and that this fact is important in its self-defense calculation, is 
apparent in several government statements regarding the resort to 
force.207 
2.4. Domestic Authority—The 2001 Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force 
The above discussion focuses on how Hamdan has been used by 
the United States to justify its actions under international law.  
Interestingly, the case is also part of the foundation of the 
government’s attempt to justify the global war against al-Qaeda 
under the domestic legal framework.  The 2001 Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorizes the President to use 
 
 205 DOJ White Paper, supra note 103, at 8 (“Moreover, where the al-Qa'ida 
member in question has recently been involved in activities posing an imminent 
threat of violent attack against the United States, and there is no evidence 
suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned such activities, that member’s 
involvement in al-Qaida’s continuing terrorist campaign against the United States 
would support the conclusion that the member poses an imminent threat.”).  
Confusingly, this discussion is found within a larger examination of the 
constitutional rights at issue in the proposed strike, although international sources 
are cited throughout.  Id. at 6–8.  It is therefore unclear if the term “imminence” is 
being used in the jus ad bellum context. 
 206 COMM. ON INT’L LAW, N.Y.C. BAR, THE LEGALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF TARGETED KILLINGS BY DRONES LAUNCHED BY THE UNITED STATES 5 (2014), 
https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072625-
TheLegalityofTargetedInternationalKillingsbyUS-LaunchedDrones.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/X6JX-NE34]. 
 207  In a 2013 address, for example, President Obama remarked: “Moreover, 
America’s actions are legal . . . . Under domestic law, and international law, the 
United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We 
are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as 
they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war—a war waged 
proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense.”  President Barack Obama, The 
Future of our Fight Against Terrorism, remarks at National Defense University 
(May 23, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/text-presidents-speech-afternoon 
[https://perma.cc/7X7T-T5C4].  It is questionable whether the classification of the 
conflict with al-Qaeda in the in bello context should bear any legal significance in 
the ad bellum framework.   
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“all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 
11, 2001.”208  The executive branch has used Hamdan in two distinct 
ways in its efforts to show compliance with the AUMF.  First, it has 
cited to Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Hamdan for the 
proposition that any operation against al-Qaeda would necessarily 
be part of the greater global armed conflict, and not constrained 
geographically by international law or the AUMF because the status 
of the parties is of paramount importance.209  It is uncertain what 
parallels are being drawn between the international law 
understanding of the armed conflict, and the scope of the conflict as 
defined in the AUMF in this instance, however. 
Secondly, the government has asserted that compliance with the 
AUMF is ultimately contingent on the country’s compliance with 
international law. 210   In other words, the AUMF should be 
interpreted as being consistent with international law. 211   After 
listing the case authorities standing for this proposition,212 the OLC 
Memorandum states that since the military operation against al-
Awlaki would be a part of the greater non-international armed 
conflict with al-Qaeda, the strike would comply with international 
law as long as it abides by the applicable rules of armed conflict.213  
The Memorandum then immediately launches into a discussion 
regarding Hamdan and the geographic scope of the non-
international armed conflict with al-Qaeda for purposes of applying 
 
 208 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001). 
 209 The DOJ White Paper, after establishing that the U.S. is currently in a non-
international armed conflict with al-Qaeda as held in Hamdan, goes on to State that: 
“Any U.S. operation would be part of this non-international armed conflict, even if 
it were to take place away from the zone of active hostilities . . . . For example, the 
AUMF itself does not set forth an express geographic limitation on the use of force 
it authorizes.”  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (what makes a non-international armed conflict distinct from an 
international armed conflict is “the legal status of the entities opposing each other”); 
DOJ White Paper, supra note 104, at 3. 
 210 OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 24. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 15, 1999) (citing several federal 
court cases, including the Supreme Court decision in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. 
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004)). 
 213 Id. at ¶ 24 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 15, 1999). 
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the laws of armed conflict. 214   In considering the fundamental 
principles of the laws of war, including military necessity, 
prevention of unnecessary suffering, proportionality and 
distinction, the document then states that the military would indeed 
abide by those precepts.215  The government’s arguments regarding 
compliance with the AUMF, then, are ultimately tied to its reading 
of Hamdan in justifying its conduct of hostilities in bello.  The memo 
ultimately concludes that the government is acting in compliance 
with international law, and therefore likewise not acting in violation 
of the AUMF.216 
3. LESSONS FROM HAMDAN 
In many ways, Hamdan is the legal keystone for many of the 
country’s global military actions today, and the root of some of its 
most criticized practices.  In effect, the Hamdan decision has been 
used by the United States as standing authority to target al-Qaeda 
and associates—assuming sovereignty and the law of armed conflict 
are considered—wherever located.  Many scholars and 
organizations have expressed concern or outright disagreement 
with this approach.217  Prominent scholars and institutions continue 
to oppose the underlying assumption itself, that a global non-
international armed conflict with al-Qaeda, in fact, has ever existed 
 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 28–29. 
 216 Id. at 30. 
 217  See, e.g., UN Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the 
Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, (Apr. 23, 2014) (“The Committee notes the State party’s 
position that drone strikes are conducted in the course of its armed conflict with Al-
Qaida, the Taliban and associated forces in accordance with its inherent right of 
national self-defence, and that they are governed by international humanitarian law 
as well as by the Presidential Policy Guidance that sets out standards for the use of 
lethal force outside areas of active hostilities.  Nevertheless, the Committee remains 
concerned about the State party’s very broad approach to the definition and 
geographical scope of ‘armed conflict’, including the end of hostilities, the unclear 
interpretation of what constitutes an ‘imminent threat’, who is a combatant or a 
civilian taking direct part in hostilities, the unclear position on the nexus that should 
exist between any particular use of lethal force and any specific theatre of hostilities, 
as well as the precautionary measures taken to avoid civilian casualties in practice 
(arts. 2, 6 and 14).”). 
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under international law.218  But until now, little attention has been 
paid to the significant role that the Hamdan decision has played in 
the government’s legal reasoning, or the precise series of links the 
executive branch has made between the holding and its legal 
justifications for its conduct of hostilities.  Whether these links and 
assertions rest on a fair interpretation of the opinion, or whether 
they constitute a house of cards built on Hamdan, is of certain interest 
to international and human rights law scholars, and the American 
public at large.219 
The Hamdan Court implicitly accepted one of the preconditions 
to the application of Common Article 3, which is the presence of an 
armed conflict.  The failure to address the “armed conflict” 
threshold matter does, and will continue to, affect reliance on the 
holding in the face of arguments that the armed conflict with al-
Qaeda has functionally ceased.220  Further, the Court’s expansive 
understanding of Common Article 3—that it stands in 
“contradistinction” to Common Article 2—has provided 
unexpected legitimacy to United States’ legal positions regarding 
extraterritorial targeting.  Whether the Court intended for this 
classification to extend beyond the borders of Afghanistan is not 
clear.  However, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court intended to 
open a transnational targeting aperture for the United States 
government.  The executive branch later used this categorization of 
hostilities to assert that the customary rules of warfare applied 
globally to the conflict with al-Qaeda, rather than more restrictive 
human rights law. 221   The Court’s avoidance in articulating the 
 
 218 See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and 
the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, at 10, 32IC/15/11 (Dec. 2015) (“The 
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taking place [between al Qaeda and the United States].”); Dinstein, Concluding 
Remarks, supra note 54, at 407–08 (stating that a non-international armed conflict 
cannot be global as only one state is in the conflict). 
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2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-war-against-al-qaeda-is-
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traditional standards of Common Article 3 application—including a 
lack of consideration of the specific organizational characteristics of 
al-Qaeda and duration and intensity of hostilities within 
Afghanistan—has paradoxically offered the American government 
much room to maneuver in interpreting the proper scope of 
applying the laws of targeting elsewhere.  The decision ultimately 
provided tacit legal validity to the government’s application of 
targeting rules to areas outside of the “hot battlefield” against 
members of al-Qaeda and associated forces.  In effect, the Hamdan 
opinion has provided the executive branch an opportunity to claim 
legal legitimacy for its actions, without discernable limits. 
The United States currently has 8,000 special operations 
personnel deployed in 80 different countries 222  in an effort to 
weaken a thriving al-Qaeda and its ideological offspring.223  A third 
Presidential administration has continued the highly-contested 
practice of lethal targeting by drones within multiple foreign 
countries.224  Concerns that the legal framework under which the 
United States conducts counter-terrorism operations encourages the 
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“creep of war” have therefore proven accurate. 225   This is not 
inconsequential behavior.  The logic of the Hamdan opinion 
underpins the United States’ ever-expanding global targeting 
campaign and other State actors appear increasingly comfortable 
with this paradigm.226  In this transnational era of warfare,227 the 
United States’ broad interpretation of the Hamdan opinion may 
become persuasive on a global scale.  The Hamdan Court’s expansive 
conflict classification, and the government’s subsequent use of that 
precedent, may also dictate future analyses regarding transnational 
non-State armed groups and accompanying rules of warfare.228  As 
a “specially affected State” the United States’ actions are extremely 
influential in developing customary international law. 229  
 
 225 See Daskal, supra note 163, at 1173; see generally ROSA BROOKS, HOW 
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tethered to active battlefields and areas where governments are acting with the 
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 228 See 2018 MILITARY FORCE REPORT, supra note 222, at 1–2 (stating that the 
United States is currently in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, al Shabaab—an 
associated force of al-Qaeda, the ISIS, the Taliban, and the Taliban Hiqqani 
Network).  Indeed, parallel reasoning may have influenced the targeting 
justifications for ISIS members located outside of the “hot battlefields” of Iraq and 
Syria. 
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Customary international law, “by its nature . . . . evolves based on 
the conduct of States combined with their opinio juris.  This 
evolutionary dynamic of crystallization is often driven by States 
acting in a manner that is not contemplated by existing law and, 
indeed, sometimes contrary to that law.”230  In fact, the Hamdan 
armed conflict classification paradigm may perhaps emerge as a 
new customary international norm.231 
The impact and continued importance of Hamdan, therefore, 
cannot be overstated.  It may also serve as a cautionary tale 
regarding judicial restraint, the domestic application of international 
law, and abdication of executive deference.  While the opinion was 
clearly intended to address the treatment of detainees, it also 
ultimately laid the legal foundation for the United States’ global 
targeting campaign through the subsequent invocation of the 
customary laws of war.  It is not clear that the Court realized the 
potential ramifications of its holding in this area. 
If a global non-international armed conflict does, indeed, exist 
between the United States and al-Qaeda, then the principle of 
humanity, as expressed through humane treatment provisions in 
Common Article 3, undoubtedly applies.  However, equally as 
applicable is the principle of military necessity which includes the 
lawful targeting of al-Qaeda members.  Balancing these competing 
principles is exceedingly important as “[d]anger ensues for the 
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international community if either concept gains primacy.”232  Over 
emphasis on military necessity has historically led to horrendous 
atrocities in warfare and “[c]onversely, when humanitarian 
concerns become dominant state military actions are unrealistically 
restricted by burdensome regulations diminishing the likelihood of 
compliance.” 233   Upsetting the delicate balance between these 
competing principles thus inevitably results in a downward spiral 
into the brutality and savagery that has for so long defined 
warfare.234  As applied by the executive branch, then, the Hamdan 
holding ultimately addresses not only the “noblest humanitarian 
impulses,” but also the military necessities of transnational 
warfare.235 
The war against al-Qaeda and associates has continued for 19 
years unabated.  Many of those now sent to fight in the conflict have 
little to no memory of its beginnings.  They deserve to understand 
how the Supreme Court, in the 2006 Hamdan decision, 
fundamentally changed the extent to which the United States 
government could legally justify where and when we can fight the 
nation’s wars.  While Hamdan is traditionally viewed as an opinion 
on detention, it has also been used to address a question that is now 
almost forgotten: what happens when we fight a transnational, 
ideologically motivated group that is not restricted by geography or 
nationality?  The significance and long-term impact of Hamdan is 
extraordinary, albeit for different reasons than intended by the 
Supreme Court. 
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